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Abstract The most prominent theories of rights, the Will Theory and the Interest
Theory, notoriously fail to accommodate all and only rights-attributions that make
sense to ordinary speakers. The Kind-Desire Theory, Leif Wenar’s recent contri-
bution to the field, appears to fare better in this respect than any of its predecessors.
The theory states that we attribute a right to an individual if she has a kind-based
desire that a certain enforceable duty be fulfilled. A kind-based desire is a reason to
want something which one has simply in virtue of being a member of a certain kind.
Rowan Cruft objects that this theory creates a puzzle about the relation between
rights and respect. In particular, if rights are not grounded in aspects of the par-
ticular individuals whose rights they are (e.g., their well-being), how can we sustain
the intuitive notion that to violate a right is to disrespect the right-holder? I present a
contractualist account of respect which reconciles the Kind-Desire Theory with the
intuition that rights-violations are disrespectful. On this account, respect for a
person is a matter of acknowledging her legitimate authority to make demands on
the will and conduct of others. And I argue that kind-based desires authorize a
person to make demands even if they do not correspond to that person’s well-being
or other non-relational features.
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1 Introduction
Leif Wenar’s analysis of rights purports to do a better job at accommodating our
ordinary understanding of rights than its competitors (2013b). His Kind-Desire
Theory states that we attribute a right to an individual if she has a kind-based desire
that a certain enforceable duty be fulfilled. A kind-based desire is a reason to want
something which one has simply in virtue of being a member of a certain kind—and
thus independently of one’s psychological states or well-being. Rowan Cruft,
however, objects that the Kind-Desire Theory creates a puzzle about the relation
between rights and respect (2013). In particular, if rights are not grounded in aspects
of the particular individuals whose rights they are, how can we sustain the intuitive
notion that to violate a right is to disrespect the right-holder?
In this paper, I invoke a contractualist account of respect to reconcile the Kind-
Desire Theory with the intuition that violating rights is disrespectful. I will begin by
sketching Wenar’s theory of rights and highlighting the ways in which it purports to
be superior to its competitors (Sect. 2). Subsequently, I will introduce Cruft’s
objection that the Kind-Desire Theory is challenged by our intuitions about the link
between rights and respect (Sect. 3). I will attempt to reconcile Wenar’s analysis of
rights with our intuitions concerning respect. In particular, I will propose a
contractualist account of respect that drives a conceptual wedge between the notions
of respecting a person on the one hand, and responding to aspects of her psychology
or well-being on the other. Finally, I will attempt to reply to potential objections to
the account presented here (Sect. 4). I will conclude that the Kind-Desire Theory of
rights and the contractualist account of respect form a fruitful synthesis that explains
both the way rights-attributtions are ordinarily understood and our intuitions
concerning the link between rights and respect (Sect. 5).
2 The Kind-Desire Theory of rights
In his seminal work on legal concepts, Wesley Hohfeld provides an analysis of the
logical structure of rights which serves as the starting point for most contemporary
theorizing about rights (Hohfeld 1964; cf. Wenar 2015). Hohfeld observes that
‘right’, both in ordinary usage and in legal disputes, is used to refer to several
distinct logical relations that can hold between legal parties. Yet, he singles out one
of the referents of rights-talk, the so-called claim-right, as paradigmatic—and to this
day a significant number of theorists side with him on this issue (e.g., Kramer and
Steiner 2007; Streenivasan 2005; Wenar 2013b). What makes a claim-right so
special is that it is correlated with a directed duty (Hohfeld 1964: 33). More
specifically, X has a claim-right that Y do u if and only if Y has a duty to X to do u,
where the clause ‘duty to X’ indicates that Y wrongs X (i.e., Y does not merely
commit a wrong) if she does not do u.1 In short, Y’s duty to u is owed to X.
1 Actually, siding with Cruft and Darwall, I believe that there are directed duties that are not correlated
with rights (Cruft 2013: 204 and 209; Darwall 2013a: 28, note 10). For example, it seems that we
sometimes owe a duty to be grateful to others. Yet, we do not ordinarily say that these others have a right
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Hohfeld has thus already provided a widely-accepted logical analysis of the most
important—and presumably philosophically most interesting—form that rights can
take. What the rights-theorist is now left with, according to Wenar, is the task of
singling out the conditions under which such claim-rights2 are attributed by
competent speakers.3 Thus, Wenar’s aim is to come up with a theory that
accommodates ‘‘all and only rights-assertions that make sense to competent users of
the language’’ (2013b: 203). Note that this is not the aim of capturing all and only
correct rights-attributions. Wenar’s objective is not to develop a theory of which
rights there are or should be but to provide an account of how rights-attributions are
ordinarily understood (2013b: 209–210). And he argues that the two most prominent
theories of rights—the Will Theory and the Interest Theory—notoriously fail to
provide such an account (2013b: 203–206).
The Will Theory, most prominently developed by H. L. A. Hart, states that X has
a right that Y do u if and only if X can legitimately waive or enforce Y’s duty to do
u (Hart 1955).4 It thus ties the notion of rights to the notion of freedom: a right gives
its holder sovereignty over a certain domain in which her will is to govern
normative relations. Wenar points out two widely recognized problems with the
Will Theory (2013b: 203). First, the Will Theory cannot account for rights-
attributions to non-human animals and other beings who are not capable of
sovereignty, e.g., children or the comatose (cf. Hart 1955: 181; MacCormick 1984).
After all, these beings do not seem to be capable of the kinds of choices which the
Will Theory takes to warrant the attribution of rights. Second, the Will Theory
notoriously denies the existence of unwaivable or inalienable rights, i.e., rights that
we possess even though we do not have the authority to waive the respective duties
(cf. Hart 1955: 176; MacCormick 1977). Rights which are ordinarily taken to be
unwaivable or inalienable include the right not to be enslaved and the rights of
citizens under criminal law.
The Interest Theory, whose most prominent defender is Joseph Raz, states that
‘‘‘x has a right’ if and only if x can have rights, and other things being equal, an
aspect of x’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other
person(s) to be under a duty’’ (Raz 1984: 195). On the most plausible reading of
Raz’s theory, X’s interest’s being ‘‘a sufficient reason’’ for taking Y to be duty-
bound means that X’s interest is what grounds or justifies Y’s duty (Cruft 2013:
Footnote 1 continued
to our gratitude. The reason seems to be that it would be inappropriate to enforce the respective duties.
Wenar, too, is sympathetic to this view (2013b: 214, note 24). For the purposes of this essay, however, I
will follow large parts of the literature by simply assuming that every directed duty corresponds to a
claim-right.
2 Since this article is concerned with claim-rights only, I will henceforth simply refer to them as ‘rights’.
3 Note that some rights-theorists do not identify capturing the ordinary understanding of rights as their
primary task (e.g., Hart 1982: 193; Kramer and Steiner 2007: 294–299). For objections to their alternative
methodologies, see Wenar (2008).
4 For another prominent version of the Will Theory, see Steiner (1994).
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205).5 The main problem with the Interest Theory, according to Wenar, is that it
cannot accommodate cases of rights that serve, not their holder’s, but one or more
third parties’ interests (2013b: 204). For example, as Raz concedes, the right of
journalists to protect their sources is not based on their interests. If this right is based
on an interest at all, it is more likely to be the public’s interest in being informed
(1984: 206). Or consider the right of a promisee to have promises made to her
fulfilled. Wenar points out that this right does not seem to hinge upon the promisee’s
having an interest in the fulfilment of the promise at all (2013b: 204). To the
contrary, no matter how conducive the fulfilment of a given promise is to a
promisee’s well-being, the promisor owes fulfilment of the promise to the promisee.
2.1 Kind-based desires and rights
In light of this mismatch between a person’s interests and her rights, Raz suggests
that rights might be ‘‘vested in right-holders because they possess certain general
characteristics: they are the beneficiaries of a promise, nationals of a certain state,
etc.’’ (1984: 208). Wenar takes this suggestion as his starting point for developing a
new theory of rights,6 the Kind-Desire Theory:
Consider a system of norms S that refers to entities under descriptions that are
kinds, D and R. If and only if, in circumstances C, a norm of S supports
statements of the form:
1. Some D (qua D) has a duty to phi some R (qua R); where ‘‘phi’’ is a verb
phrase specifying an action, such as ‘‘pay benefits to’’, ‘‘refrain from
touching’’, ‘‘shoot’’, and so on.
2. Rs (qua Rs) want such duties to be fulfilled; and
3. Enforcement of this duty is appropriate, ceteris paribus;
Then: the R has a claim-right in S that the D fulfil this duty in circumstances
C. (Wenar 2013b: 219)
Note that condition 1 requires, not only that the D (qua D) has a duty to perform a
certain action, phi, but also that she has a duty to perform this action under the
particular description ‘phi some R (qua R)’. Thus, for example, Wenar’s theory
correctly predicts that prison wardens do not have a legal right that prisoners stay in
prison (Wenar 2013a, b: 211). For, even though prisoners have a legal duty to stay
in prison, the legal system that attributes this duty to them does not mention wardens
5 Note that Matthew Kramer’s version of the Interest Theory holds that X has a right that Y do u if the
fulfillment of Y’s duty to u ‘‘necessarily involves the protection of some aspect of [X’s] situation that is
generally beneficial for any typical human being or collectivity or non-human creature’’ (Kramer and
Steiner 2007: 290). This view seems to avoid the difficulty for Raz’s account which I mentioned since it is
not committed to the notion that the right-holder’s interests ground the right. However, as Streenivasan
points out, Kramer’s view faces a different, yet equally troublesome objection (Streenivasan 2005:
262–264, 2010: 485–486; for Kramer’s reply and a criticism thereof see Kramer and Steiner 2007:
301–304; Wenar 2008: 258, note 9, respectively).
6 For previous attempts to develop a preferable alternative to the Will and Interest Theories, see
Streenivasan (2005, 2010) and Wenar (2005). For objections to these, see Kramer and Steiner (2007).
J. D. Schaab
123
in the explication of that duty. That is, it does not specify that ‘prisoners (qua
prisoners) have a duty to stay in the prisons of wardens (qua wardens)’.
For our purposes, however, condition 2 is the more interesting one. It requires
that the R has a kind-based desire, i.e., a desire qua R, that D phi the R. It is
important to note that this condition does not refer to the R’s psychological states.
Rather, the condition requires that every R, in virtue of being a member of the kind
R, has a reason to want the duty in question to be fulfilled (Wenar 2013b: 207).
Wenar defines a kind as ‘‘a set of entities that share defining characteristics’’ (2013b:
218) He goes on to list three classes of kinds that might warrant the attribution of
kind-based desires.
The first class of kinds that Wenar mentions are social roles that entail special
duties; that is, bearers of these roles have certain duties solely in virtue of bearing
these roles (2013b: 206–207). The kind-based desire attributed to bearers of such
roles is simply the desire to fulfil these duties. For example, Wenar observes that,
historically, the right to free speech used to be linked to the desire of citizens (qua
citizens) to speak freely which in turn was based on their duty (qua citizens) to
participate in public discourse (2013b: 221). Indeed, Wenar suggests that,
originally, all rights were attributed on the basis of such duty-laden roles.
Nowadays, however, a role need not entail any duties to warrant the attribution of
a kind-based desire. The role of a promisee, for example, does not seem to come
with special duties. At any rate, no such duty seems to serve the purpose of
motivating the attribution of rights to promisees. Hence, the second class of kinds
that Wenar mentions are roles which warrant the attribution of kind-based desires,
not because they assign duties to the ones who bear the roles, but by virtue of role-
norms (2013b: 216). That is, the desires associated with these roles are entailed in
the significance that these roles have within the system of norms of which they form
parts. Accordingly, to understand these roles is to know that certain desires are
attributed to their bearers. In the case of promisees, the norm governing the role
attributes to all promisees (qua promisees) a desire that promises that were made to
them be fulfilled. According to Wenar, desire-ascriptions based on role-norms form
an essential part of our social lives: they help us make sense of social situations and
we rely on them in navigating social reality (2013b: 215).
The third class of kinds that warrant the attribution of kind-based desires is the
class of natural kinds such as human beings, children, and animals. Wenar suggests
that, for the case of a natural kind, the kind-based desires consist in the interests that
members of this kind have qua their membership in this kind (2013b: 227). Wenar
observes that, here, his theory partly coincides with versions of the Interest Theory
which embrace an ‘‘objective list’’ account of well-being that take the quality of a
creature’s life to depend not only on her balance of pleasure over pain, but also on
the extent to which it contains intrinsic goods such as knowledge and meaningful
relationships (2013b: 226–227).
The Kind-Desire Theory appears to escape the problems faced by the Interest
Theory and the Will Theory. In particular, since it does not rely on rights’ furthering
the well-being of their holders in all cases, it can account for rights which do not
reflect the interests of their holders—as opposed to the Interest Theory. For
example, it can account for the right of journalists to conceal their sources by
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referring to a norm according to which journalists—qua journalists, and thus
independently of their individual interests—have a desire to keep their sources
secret. Moreover, since the Kind-Desire Theory has the conceptual resources to
attribute rights solely on grounds of facts about a right-holder’s well-being which
hold by virtue of her membership in a natural kind, Wenar’s theory can
accommodate the rights of creatures with a limited capacity for choice, as well as
unwaivable rights—as opposed to the Will Theory. After all, while some kinds (e.g.,
the role of journalist) can be entered and exited by an act of will, membership in
other kinds (such as more robust social roles, and natural kinds) is not sensitive to
the will of individuals in this way (Wenar 2013b: 217–218). Having outlined
Wenar’s theory of rights and its advantages over the Will and Interest Theories, I
will next turn to Cruft’s worry concerning the Kind-Desire Theory’s prospects of
accommodating our intuitions about respect and outline a reply to this worry.
3 Rights and respect
Much theorizing about rights seems to proceed on the implicit assumption that a
theory which correctly predicts rights-attributions will also explain how rights are
justified. And, indeed, it seems natural to suppose that, in order to determine when a
right is attributed, one has to determine ‘what rights do for us’, i.e., how they
strengthen the position of their holders. The Kind-Desire Theory, however,
abandons this methodology. It specifies the conditions under which we attribute
rights, but it does not provide a unified rationale of the morally relevant relation
between rights and right-holders. In Wenar’s words, ‘‘the analysis carries no
commitments regarding the justification of rights’’ (2013b: 209).
Cruft acknowledges that Wenar’s detachment of the justification of rights from
their attribution accounts for his theory’s success at capturing the ordinary
understanding of rights (2013: 209). Yet, he argues that—precisely in virtue of this
methodological move—the Kind-Desire Theory also creates a puzzle about the link
between rights and respect. Specifically, Cruft suggests that it is intuitively plausible
to hold that ‘‘[v]iolation of any duty owed to a person, animal or group is
disrespectful to that person, animal or group’’ (2013: 202, italics deleted).7
Moreover, he notes that even if the duty in question is not moral but socially created
(like the duty not to foul a player in football), insofar as the duty is morally justified
and owed to someone, the disrespect shown by violating it is moral in character
(Cruft 2013: 203). In addition, to violate a right seems to be disrespectful to the
individual who holds the right, rather than to the normative system that warrants the
right-attribution (ibid.).
Cruft further suggests that, for the violation of a right to disrespect the right-
holder, the right must have ‘‘individualistic justification’’ (2013: 204). And,
according to Cruft, a right is individualistically justified if and only if its violation
7 Cruft follows Judith Thomson in using the term ‘violation’ to denote only those rights-infringements,
viz. performances (omissions) of actions prohibited (required) by a right, which are unjustified and
inexcusable (Cruft 2013: 202–203; Thomson 1990: 122). I will stick to this usage throughout this paper.
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‘‘involve[s] failure to respond to something of non-instrumental importance that is
genuinely about that being [i.e., the right-holder]’’ (2013: 214, italics added). Now,
Cruft grants that, on the picture that Wenar draws, rights attached to natural kinds
and rights attached to roles that come with special duties are individualistically
justified (Cruft 2013: 217). After all, Wenar characterizes these rights as enhancing
the well-being of their holders or as enabling them to fulfil their obligations, and
thus as ‘doing something for them’. However, there is a puzzle about the rights that,
according to Wenar, are based on role-norms. After all, the attribution of this latter
set of rights is supposed to be insensitive to role-bearers’ actual psychology, well-
being, and—it seems—any facts that are genuinely about them. Instead, the Kind-
Desire Theory links these rights to the social significance of the roles occupied by
their holders. And, presumably, the social significance of roles is often due to the
interests of society as a whole rather than aspects of the individuals who occupy
them. Since rights attributed on the basis of role-norms thus do not appear to be
individualistically justified, the question is how their violation can be disrespectful
to their holders.
For example, take the case of property rights. In Wenar’s view, such rights are
attributed insofar as there is a norm according to which owners of property have a
kind-based desire that certain duties (e.g., to refrain from coercively stripping
owners of their property) be fulfilled (Wenar 2013b: 216–217). Further, the Kind-
Desire Theory holds that this kind-based desire is attributed in accordance with the
social significance of the role of owner, which in turn is justified (if it is justified) as
part of a system of norms that serves the interests of society as a whole.
Accordingly, it seems that property rights as characterized by the Kind-Desire
Theory are not individualistically justified. But how is it to be explained, then, that
violations of property rights are disrespectful? Surely, property rights sometimes
serve the interests of their holders. Yet, it seems that even in those cases in which
they do not, it is disrespectful to violate them.
I share Cruft’s intuitions about the link between rights and respect. Further, I
agree that the Kind-Desire Theory may initially appear to create a puzzle about this
link. In what follows, however, I introduce a contractualist account of respect which
reconciles the Kind-Desire Theory with the intuitive link between rights and
respect. In fact, this account of respect shows that, in an important sense, rights as
characterized by the Kind-Desire theory can be considered as individualistically
justified.
3.1 An alternative account of respect
Contractualism is the view that ‘what we owe to each other’ as a matter of mutual
respect for each other’s personhood is determined by the principles which no one
can reasonably reject (Darwall 2006: chapter 12; Kumar 2003a; Scanlon 1998: 106).
In this view, our conduct is disrespectful to a person if and only if that person can
reasonably complain about the principle underlying our actions, i.e., if she can
demand that we refrain from acting in this way. In favor of this view, Stephen
Darwall draws a distinction between two attitudes that one might have towards a
person: respect and care (2006: esp. chapter 6). And he ties this distinction to a
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distinction between two kinds of practical reason. He illustrates this point by an
example (2006: 5–10).
Suppose one person, A, is standing on the foot of another person, B. According to
Darwall, A might recognize two kinds of reasons to remove her foot. On the one
hand, A might recognize that by standing on B’s foot she is causing B to be in pain.
And A might further recognize that pain detracts from the value of a state of the
world and that, therefore, she can bring about a more valuable state of the world by
removing her foot. If A removes her foot for this reason, she acts from care or
sympathetic concern for B. Darwall observes that this reason is ‘‘agent-neutral’’
since it serves as a reason to remove A’s foot from on top of B’s, not only for A, but
for anyone (2006: 6). Moreover, this reason is ‘‘state-of-the-world-regarding’’ in the
sense that its normativity derives from the independent value of some state of the
world (ibid.). Accordingly, if the state of the world in question (or an even more
valuable one) was to be brought about by another course of action, e.g., by leaving
A’s foot on B’s foot, then this reason would not direct us to remove A’s foot at all.
On the other hand, A might acknowledge that B can legitimately demand that A
remove her foot, thus holding A accountable. This reason is agent-relative, in the
sense that it serves as a reason to remove A’s foot only for A.8 Moreover, it is
‘‘authority-regarding’’ as its validity rests, not on the independent value of a state of
the world, but on the relation of authority and accountability that holds between B
and A. Accordingly, as opposed to the state-of-the-world-regarding alternative, this
reason will never serve as a reason to leave A’s foot on B’s. Darwall labels
authority-regarding reasons ‘‘second-personal’’ since they are valid if and only if
they are addressable person-to-person within what he calls ‘‘the second-person
stance’’ (2006: 8–9). According to Darwall, A respects B only if she acts on this
second-personal reason because only this reason reflects B’s dignity, understood as
the ‘‘second-personal authority’’ to make legitimate demands (2006: esp. chapters 6
and 10).9
Darwall argues that it follows from this that respect must always be reciprocal
(2006: esp. chapter 10). After all, if A’s respect for B requires A’s recognition of
B’s authority over A, then it also requires that A recognize that she can be held
accountable by B. And, if B is to hold A accountable intelligibly, it must be assumed
that A is capable, not only of acting as B directs, but also of freely endorsing the
validity of B’s demands, and of directing her will accordingly. Otherwise, any
attempt by B to hold A accountable will amount to mere coercion. It follows that if
B is to have authority over A, A must be capable of holding herself accountable for
acting as B’s demands direct. In Darwall’s words, A must possess ‘‘second-personal
competence’’ (Darwall 2006: 249). But this places limits on what B may demand of
8 Admittedly, another person, C, might have a reason to interfere with A’s behavior. However, this is not
the same reason that A has to remove her foot. To see this, consider that if C successfully interfered, B’s
demand on A would not wither away—A would still have to answer to B. Conversely, if C did not
interfere but A removed her foot of her own accord, then C would still be accountable to A for her refusal
to interfere.
9 Note that, in this essay, we are concerned with what Darwall calls ‘‘recognition respect’’, as opposed to
‘‘appraisal respect’’ (1977).
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A: B’s demands must be such that A can freely impose them on herself, i.e., they
must be justifiable to A. But this means that B must assume that A has second-
personal authority to hold B accountable. Therefore, respect is always reciprocal
and linked to the notion of the equal dignity of all members of the moral
community. I take it that this element of reciprocity accounts for the ‘reasonability’
clause in the formulation of contractualism stated above: whether our conduct
expresses mutual respect for each other’s dignity as persons depends, not just on
whether we have reasons to reject the principles underlying each other’s actions, but
also on whether we can justify these reasons to one another.
The immediately relevant upshot of all this is the following: on the contractualist
account of respect, whether disrespect necessarily ‘‘involve[s] failure to respond to
something of non-instrumental importance that is genuinely about that being’’, as
Cruft suggests (2013: 214), depends on what is meant by ‘‘something of non-
instrumental importance’’. Insofar as this clause denotes features of the disrespected
being which are intrinsically valuable in the sense that they make a positive
contribution to the value of the state of the world in which they are instantiated,
contractualists like Darwall will deny that disrespect must always involve a failure
to respond to these features. After all, on the contractualist account, respect is a
matter of responding correctly to someone’s authority, not their value. In Darwall’s
words, ‘‘whereas respecting someone entails relating to her as a being with a
dignity, caring for someone involves viewing her as a being with a welfare’’ (2006:
126).10
3.2 Shared reasons in contractualism
We have seen that the contractualist account of respect draws a distinction between
respect for a person and care for a person’s welfare or other valuable features.
Nevertheless, this distinction does not rule out the possibility that disrespect for a
person always coincides with a failure to take her valuable features into account.
After all, it is possible that all the legitimate demands that persons are authorized to
make on each other’s will and conduct appeal to valuable aspects of their well-being
or psychology (as many such demands do, undoubtedly). Accordingly, even on the
contractualist account, it might be true that violating a right is disrespectful if and
only if the right is conducive to one or more of these features.
However, a suggestion by Scanlon will help us to make some headway. He
contends that in determining whether or not a given principle can be reasonably
rejected, we cannot take all the objections to the principle that various individuals
might have into account (1998: 105). I take this to reflect the reciprocal element of
contractualism which I mentioned above: in order for B to reasonably reject the
principle underlying A’s action, B’s rejection must in turn be justifiable to A. And,
10 Kumar makes the companion point that, in contractualism, wronging a person is not reducible to
harming a person (2003a). Although in harming a person we often wrong her (since harming often
involves acting on a principle that the victim can reasonably reject), the wrong cannot be reduced to the
harm that we do to the victim. Rather, the wrong consists in our failure to relate to the victim as someone
who can demand that we act on principles that no one can reasonably reject.
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arguably, it is not justifiable to A that she should take into account all the reasons
that B might have for rejecting the principle underlying A’s actions. More
specifically, Scanlon suggests that the reasons that may be invoked in order
reasonably to reject a principle are ‘‘generic reasons’’, viz., ‘‘reasons that we can see
that people have in virtue of their situation, characterized in general terms, and such
things as their aims and capabilities and the conditions in which they are placed’’
(1998: 204). It follows that which reasons B can invoke in order to reasonably reject
the principle underlying A’s action is independent of B’s mental states, well-being,
or any other aspect of B, considered as an individual person. Rather, there is a set of
generic reasons that is public in the sense that every member of the moral
community is entitled to appeal to the reasons included in this set simply in virtue of
being a certain type of person in a certain type of situation.11
Could kind-based desires that are attributed on the basis of role-norms, which
Wenar takes to explain the attribution of certain rights, be included in the public set
of reasons for complaint? Scanlon does recognize that some individual rights might
ultimately be grounded in the value that certain social practices have for the wider
society (2003: 107). For instance, he observes that one might argue that journalists
have to be attributed certain rights ‘‘if ‘the press’ is to fulfil its function in society’’
(2003: 158). One might object, however, that kind-based desires do not pass what
Kumar calls the ‘‘individual reasons restriction’’ of contractualism (Kumar 2003a: 9,
note 6). More specifically, Kumar points out that, in contractualism, if an individual
is reasonably to reject a principle, she must point out some way in which she is
adversely affected by the principle’s general acceptance (ibid., cf. Scanlon 1998:
118–223). Consequently, Kumar explains, ‘‘neither appeals to the aggregate value
of outcomes, nor to the aggregate force of individual reasons, are valid grounds for
wanting to reasonably reject a proposed principle’’ (ibid.).
This restriction is a vital aspect of contractualism since it prevents the view from
collapsing into consequentialism. After all, contractualism was supposed to
emphasise relations of mutual respect, not the aggregate good, as the primary
concern of interpersonal morality. What is more, it would be detrimental to my
argument if kind-based desires based on role-norms did not honor this restriction.
After all, I aim to show that violating rights attributed on the basis of such desires is
disrespectful to the right-holder. Hence, it would be problematic if such desires
could be shown to stand in no morally important relation to the individual right-
holder whatsoever.
However, I do not think that kind-based desires that are attributed to individuals
for the sake of society’s interests violate the individual reasons restriction. In order
to see this, it is important to distinguish society’s justification for adding a reason to
the public set of generic reasons from an individual’s justification for reasonably
rejecting a principle by appealing to such a reason. Even if society’s justification for
viewing promisees as having a desire to have their promises fulfilled is that doing so
serves the interests of the public, an individual promisee who appeals to this desire
in order to demand that a certain promise to her be kept is not thereby citing the
11 For an insightful exploration of this aspect of contractualism, see Kumar (2003a, 2009).
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interests of the public as her justification. It seems that, once a reason is part of the
public set of generic reasons which a certain type of person is taken to have, not to
take this reason into account in our deliberations is to disrespect these persons—
even if attributing this reason to them in the first place does not serve their interests.
After all, to do so is to acknowledge, on the one hand, that persons of their kind have
this reason, but to deny, on the other hand, that they have the authority to make
demands on our deliberation on the basis of this reason. In other words, it is to relate
to them as lacking second-personal authority, and thus dignity.
To illustrate this, let us return to the case of property rights. In Wenar’s view,
such rights are attributed insofar as there is a norm according to which owners of
property have a kind-based desire for the fulfilment of certain duties. Now, on my
account, even if the reason why we attribute this kind-based desire to owners is that
viewing them in this way is beneficial to society as a whole, we thereby accord to
each individual owner a reason to complain about the kinds of actions that count as
violations of their property rights. Accordingly, any violation of such a right, even if
it consists in the damaging or stealing of a part of the owner’s property that she does
not even want or need, is disrespectful to the owner. After all, any such violation
represents the owner as not having any authority to demand that her property be left
to her. Thus, it is to represent her as lacking the authority to make claims on the
basis of those reasons on the basis of which second-personally competent owners,
qua owners, can make legitimate claims. In other words, to violate a property right
is to relate to the owner as a being lacking second-personal standing.
3.3 Individualistic justification revisited
I argued that the contractualist account of respect explains how the Kind-Desire
Theory is compatible with the intuition that violating rights is disrespectful, even if
it does not involve a failure to respond to an independently valuable feature of the
right-holder, such as her well-being. But what has become of Cruft’s observation
that, according to the Kind-Desire Theory, not all rights are individualistically
justified? I have not said anything to suggest that this observation is false. So one
might take my argument so far to reject the notion that violating rights is
disrespectful to the right-holder only if the right in question is individualistically
justified. However, I now want to suggest that, given the contractualist account of
respect, there is an important sense in which rights as characterized by the Kind-
Desire Theory are individualistically justified.
Cruft seems implicitly to assume that a right is individualistically justified only if
it is grounded in a non-relational, valuable aspect of the right-holder. But I think
that we can view a right as individualistically justified also if it is based on a
relational property of its holder, viz., an aspect of the ways in which she relates to
other persons and vice versa. And the aspect of relations between persons that seems
particularly fit to play the role of grounding rights within the framework of the
Kind-Desire Theory and the contractualist account of respect is equality. There are
two reasons for this. First, equality seems to capture the special moral significance
of rights, especially their close link with the notion of respect. Second, whether
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treating a person in a certain way counts as relating to her as an equal depends on
the kind of society one lives in. Let me expand on each of these reasons in turn.
In his seminal essay on rights, Joel Feinberg draws a connection between rights
and the activity of claiming, thus partly anticipating the contractualist account of
respect outlined above (1970). In particular, he maintains that whereas normative
systems without rights might well be able to protect and promote various valuable
aspects of individuals and society, only a regime of rights allows individuals to
claim that certain norms be obeyed. For rights are, in Feinberg’s words, ‘‘especially
sturdy objects to ‘stand upon’’’ (1970: 252). And he goes on to argue that this fact,
i.e., that rights enable us to make claims on each other, accounts for the special
moral significance of rights (ibid.). What is this special moral significance? Feinberg
suggests that ‘‘[h]aving rights enables us to ‘stand up like men’, to look others in the
eye, and to feel in some fundamental way the equal of anyone’’ (1970: 252, italics
added). That is, the moral significance of rights is that they facilitate relations of
equality among right-holders.
One might object that any system of norms can treat all persons as equals, e.g., by
attaching the same weight to everyone’s interests (cf. Hare 1984: 107). However, it
seems plausible that only a system that enables persons to make claims on each
other will support interpersonal relations (or, more precisely, relatings) of
equality.12 That is, only if we can address each other person-to-person we will be
able to relate to ourselves and each other as equal members of the moral
community. And Feinberg goes on to link this way of relating to one another to the
notion of respect:
To think of oneself as the holder of rights is not to be unduly but properly
proud, to have that minimal self-respect that is necessary to be worthy of the
love and esteem of others. […] To respect a person then, or to think of him as
possessed of human dignity, simply is to think of him as a potential maker of
claims. (Ibid., italics Feinberg’s)
The special significance of rights, on this account, is explained by their claimability.
Since rights can be claimed, they allow us to reflect, in our relatings, the equal
standing of every member of the moral community. By viewing ourselves as
someone who can make claims on others, we regard ourselves as possessing a
dignity, and thus as deserving of respect. And by acknowledging the claims that
others in turn have on us, we recognize them as morally on a par with ourselves, as
equal members of the moral community. In Darwall’s words, to recognize
someone’s legitimate demands on us is ‘‘to respect him as a person, or as another
person (as someone ‘just like me’)’’ (Darwall 2013a: 29, italics Darwall’s).13
12 For an insightful account of relational equality, see Anderson (1999).
13 Elements of this account of dignity can also be found in Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue: ‘‘a human being
regarded as a person […] possesses a dignity […] by which he exacts respect for himself from all other
rational beings in the world. He can measure himself with every other being of this kind and value himself
on a footing of equality with them’’ (1996: 6:434–435, italics Kant’s). For a similar account, see Waldron
(2012).
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Thus, relational equality is the right kind of property to figure in an
individualistic justification of rights since it seems to capture the special moral
significance of rights, especially their link to respect for persons. The second reason
why relational equality is particularly apt to play this role within the framework of
the Kind-Desire Theory is that whether persons relate to each other as equals seems
to be a function, not only of how they treat one another, but also of the kind of
society they live in. As Elizabeth Anderson, who advocates relational equality under
the heading ‘‘democratic equality’’, explains:
[Democratic equality] requires that everyone have effective access to enough
resources to avoid being oppressed by others and to function as an equal in civil
society. What counts as ‘enough’ varies with cultural norms, the natural
environment, and individual circumstance. For example, cultural norms and
climate influence what kind of clothing one needs to be able to appear in public
without shame and with adequate protection from the elements. (1999: 320)
Thus, whether the way an individual is treated by others and the resources to which
she has access enable her to stand in relations of equality with others partly depends
on the content of certain shared practices of her society and culture. I suggest that
the attribution of kind-based desires to the bearers of certain roles is one of these
practices.14
More specifically, I suggest that if society attributes a certain desire, e.g., that
promises be kept, to a certain kind of person, e.g., promisees, this is tantamount to
raising the stakes for respecting the equal dignity of persons of this kind. For it
seems to make these persons vulnerable to treatments to which they were hitherto
not vulnerable. Once it is part of our shared practices to view promisees as having a
desire that promises to them be kept, it is disrespectful to break any particular
promise without excuse or justification—even if the promisee in question has no
independent interest in the content of the promise. Not to acknowledge a particular
promisee’s kind-based desire in the fulfillment of the promise as a legitimate ground
of complaint is to make an exception to the shared practice of viewing promisees in
this way. It is thus to deny her the authority to make claims by invoking the shared
reasons for complaint which every person of her kind can legitimately invoke. And
this, in turn, is tantamount to a failure to acknowledge her equal dignity as a
member of the community.
4 Objections
In the previous section, I argued that Wenar’s Kind-Desire Theory of rights can be
reconciled with the link between rights and respect highlighted by Cruft. In this
section, I will discuss some potential objections. I hope that this will further clarify
the view I am proposing.
14 Put another way, kind-based desires form part of what Rawls calls ‘‘the social bases of self-respect’’
(1980: 526).
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4.1 Who has the strongest complaint?
One might object that it is not particularly helpful to employ contractualism in order
to save a theory of rights. After all, as Wenar himself argues, contractualism is
strikingly unsatisfactory with regard to its treatment of rights (2013a). He observes
that, on their most plausible reading, ‘‘[c]ontractualist principles ascribe rights to the
strongest complainants’’ (2013a: 392). That is, a person is attributed a right if her
reasons to complain about alternative arrangements, i.e., arrangements under which
she does not have the right in question, are stronger than anyone else’s reasons to
complain about the right-attribution. Wenar argues that this proposal is unsatisfac-
tory for two reasons.
The first problem is that there are many cases in which the right-holder does not
seem to be the person whose complaint fixes the principle which attributes the right
(Wenar 2013a: 392–395). For example, as we’ve seen in Sect. 2, promisees are
attributed a right to have their promises fulfilled, but this right is not attributed on
the basis of a reason that promisees (qua individual persons) have to want their
promises to be fulfilled. I think that this objection highlights a genuine gap in the
most common versions of contractualism, such as Scanlon’s formulation of the view
(1998). If reasons for complaint explain the moral significance rights, why are there
rights that do not seem to reflect the legitimate complaints of their holders, but the
interests of some third party or collective? However, here it is of vital importance to
note that I am not advertising contractualism as a complete theory of rights. I am
neither suggesting that contractualism coincides with the Kind-Desire Theory, nor
that it should replace the latter. Instead, I propose that the Kind-Desire Theory of
rights and contractualism can form a mutually beneficial synthesis. Now, one of the
lessons that the Kind-Desire Theory teaches us is that society sometimes attributes
reasons for complaint to individuals, not based on their actual psychology, well-
being or other non-relational features, but on the basis of the interests of society. My
suggestion is therefore that in cases in which there does not seem to be much at
stake for the right-holder, considered as an individual, she is nonetheless the
strongest complainant because she is attributed a kind-based desire that does not
correspond to her actual psychology or well-being. Thus, Wenar’s very own theory
solves the problem that he identified for contractualism by pointing out the
possibility that a reason for complaint can be founded on a kind-based desire rather
than in the psychological states or well-being of an individual.15
4.2 Not all contractualist principles ascribe rights
The second problem for contractualism that Wenar points out is that contractualism
takes all moral principles to be fixed by the strongest complaint, but only some
15 Wenar seems to anticipate that his own theory will provide the answer to this challenge for
contractualism. He writes: ‘‘[u]ntil I or someone else presents an adequate account of directed moral
requirements, locating rights within contractualism will remain a standing challenge’’ (2013a: 397).
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moral principles ascribe rights (2013a: 392).16 Indeed, it seems that any plausible
moral theory will advocate requirements which are not correlated with rights, e.g., a
principle of beneficence.
However, I think that this problem can again be solved with the resources
provided by the Kind-Desire Theory. According to this theory, for a requirement to
be correlated with a right it is not only necessary that there is an individual that has a
kind-based desire in the fulfillment of the requirement but also that the
requirement’s formulation, if made explicit, mentions the right-holder (condition 1),
and that it would be appropriate to enforce the requirement (condition 3) (Wenar
2013b: 219). I suggest that contractualists can explain moral principles which do not
attribute rights by pointing out that one or both of these conditions is not met.
In the case of a principle of beneficence, condition 3 seems to be unfulfilled.
Principles of beneficence are notoriously indeterminate in that they do not prescribe
specific external acts (see Hope 2014). Rather, in any given situation it takes
judgement to determine which beneficent action (if any) is required by the principle.
For example, one might argue that I am required to help you carry your washing
machine to your flat upstairs if I have no reason not to do so whatsoever (i.e., I do not
have anything better to do, I am not suffering from any bodily impairments, etc.). But I
am certainly not required to help you if a close friend of mine has just been in a horrible
car accident and I am on my way to the hospital to see if he is alright. Because of this
indeterminacy it is not possible—and, a fortiori, not appropriate—to enforce the
requirement issued by a principle of beneficence. And this plausibly explains why this
principle does not attribute any rights.17 Once again, Wenar’s theory solves a problem
of contractualism, proving the fruitfulness of combining the two views.
4.3 Some directed duties are not demandable
Cruft makes two objections to the view that to violate a directed duty is
disrespectful because compliance with the duty can legitimately be demanded
(2013: 215). His first objection is that compliance with some directed duties cannot
be appropriately demanded. For example, according to Cruft, it would be morally
impermissible to demand that people fulfill their duty of gratitude. In fact, it seems
that demanding compliance with this duty would undermine the possibility of
showing genuine gratitude. Yet, it seems that I fail to respect you if I do not thank
you, say, for helping me to carry a heavy object.
First of all, I do not share Cruft’s intuition that it is morally impermissible to
demand gratitude. It is certainly not very tactful to do so in many circumstances, but
I do not see any reason to think that it would be morally wrong. Second, while it is
true that it is sometimes self-undermining to demand what one is owed, the account
16 Scanlon never specifies which principles he takes to ascribe rights, and he denies that this question is
of great importance (2013: 405).
17 One interesting question is whether the duty of beneficence is nevertheless directed such that
whenever we are required to perform a certain act of beneficence, we owe this performance to the patient
of our beneficence. I am inclined to affirm this (also see note 1), although the answer that is traditionally
given in the literature is no.
Why it is Disrespectful to Violate Rights: Contractualism…
123
presented here does not claim that one can effectively demand compliance with all
the duties owed to one. It suffices that one has reasons that would morally warrant
such a demand. Here, it is helpful to note that, on Darwall’s account, certain
legitimate demands are ‘‘‘in force’ from the moral point of view’’ (2006: 9, 2006:
244, note 2, 2007: 65, 2013a: 23, 2014: 10–11). That is, in our deliberations we must
view persons as though they explicitly invoked their authority to make these
demands, independently of whether they formulate them explicitly.
4.4 Demandability does not single out the right-holder
Next, Cruft argues that it seems intuitively plausible that everyone can legitimately
demand compliance with anyone’s rights; hence, the standing to demand can hardly
serve to single out the right-holder as the victim of disrespect (Cruft 2013: 215; cf.
May 2015: 527).
However, I think that the account on which disrespect is a matter of neglecting
legitimate demands has the resources to single out the right-holder as the party that is
disrespected by a rights-violation. For while every member of the moral community
can legitimately demand that a right not be violated, the right-holder seems to have a
special, privileged standing to hold perpetrators accountable. Darwall captures this
differential standing by distinguishing between the ‘‘representative authority’’ of
members of the moral community and the ‘‘individual authority’’ of the right-holder
(Darwall 2013a: 32–39).18 Moreover, he points out that this difference in authority is
reflected by the kinds of reactive attitudes each of the parties may adopt: while all
members of the moral community may adopt impersonal reactive attitudes (such as
blame or indignation), the right-holder may adopt personal reactive attitudes (such as
resentment) towards the perpetrator (ibid.).
4.5 Unwaivable rights
Since the account presented here emphasizes the right-holder’s authority to demand
compliance with her rights, one might object that, similarly to the Will Theory, it
cannot accommodate the disrespectfulness of violating unwaivable or inalienable
rights (Wenar 2013b: 203, note 1).
However, the contractualist account does not imply that the disrespectfulness of a
rights-violation depends on whether or not the right-holder chooses to demand
compliance. For the authority which underwrites a right’s moral significance need
not be discretional authority (cf. May 2015: 527). Indeed, on the account presented
here, at least some of the legitimate demands attributed to persons must be viewed
as ‘in force’ irrespective of whether they choose to invoke them. As noted in
18 Simon May notes that, if this argument of Darwall’s is to address Cruft’s objection, it must explain the
distinction between the authority of the right-holder and that of the rest of the moral community without
relying on the fact that the right-holder, as opposed to the rest of the moral community, is disrespected by
rights-violations (2015: 527–528). Hence, I think that the moral community’s representative authority
should be construed as derived from (and thus as dependent on) the right-holder’s individual
authority (pace Darwall 2007: 60–64).
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Sect. 3, the practice of addressing demands necessarily presupposes the equal
dignity of all members of the moral community. This presupposition is plausibly
seen as limiting which demands can legitimately be addressed or waived (cf.
Darwall 2006: 263–268).19
4.6 Disrespect to the person qua individual?
One might object that, strictly speaking, my argument in this paper only
characterizes rights-violations as disrespectful to the right-holder qua member of
a certain kind but not to the individual who holds the right.20 The idea underlying
this objection is that one can step back from one’s identity as a kind-member and
thus shield oneself from the disrespect others show to this identity.
However, as I argued above, respect for a person’s dignity requires taking into
account her legitimate complaints, including those attributed to her in virtue of her
roles. Accordingly, on my view, a person’s dignity is partly socially constituted in
the sense that what actions constitute instances of disrespect to her dignity partly
depends on which kind-based desires her community attributes to her. Therefore,
one cannot step back from one’s roles and divorce disrespect to these roles from
disrespect to one’s dignity. My view can thus be characterized as depicting person
as a (meta-) kind which comes with the kind-based desire to have one’s more
specific kind-based desires fulfilled.21 Indeed, insofar as we are committed to
respecting our own dignity as a necessary presupposition of the second-person
stance, my account suggest that, to a certain degree, we are required to take our
roles seriously and insist on our rights as a matter of self-respect.22
4.7 Rights of the incompetent
The final objection states that the contractualist account presented here cannot
accommodate the rights of non-human animals23 and other creatures who are
incapable of making demands.24 There are at least two potential lines of response to
this objection.
19 Indeed, Darwall suggests that this presupposition gives rise to certain requirements of self-respect,
e.g., the requirement against servility suggested by Thomas Hill (Darwall 2013b: 121; Hill 1973).
20 I am indebted to Antony Duff for suggesting this objection.
21 For suggesting this way of stating my view, I am once again indebted to Antony Duff.
22 I should again emphasize that I am assuming that the normative system of which the roles in question
form part is morally justified. Moreover, it is important to note that my view does not prohibit abandoning
a role that one does not appreciate. It merely states that as long as one occupies the role, one should take
the rights that are attached to it seriously as a matter of self-respect.
23 It would be premature to rule out that some non-human animals are second-personally competent (cf.
Darwall 2006: 43, note 8, 175). Frans DeWaal’s research suggests that some non-human animals might
possess rudimentary second-personal capacities or, at least, that the difference between humans and non-
humans in this respect is one of degree rather than kind (DeWaal 1996).
24 For a criticism of contract theories along these lines, see Nussbaum (2007). Note that this objection
does not affect contractualism quite as strongly as the Will Theory. Some beings (e.g., children and the
comatose) possess the capacity to make demands but not the ability to exercise normative control.
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First, note that the Kind-Desire Theory explains why rights-attributions to
second-personally incompetent beings make sense to ordinary speakers (because
these beings can be attributed kind-based desires qua members of natural kinds).
What the account presented here seems to deny is that violating these rights is
disrespectful. The first potential line of response would just be to say that this is
precisely as it should be. However, I suspect that this might be unsatisfactory to
many readers.
The second line of response would be to suggest that there is a shared practice of
attributing legitimate demands to beings incapable of second-personal address.
These demands would not be too different from those that we attribute to second-
personally competent beings by virtue of their kind-membership, and thus
independently of their psychological states and well-being. Just like these more
familiar demands, demands attributed to second-personally incompetent beings
would be ‘in force’ for the purposes of moral reasoning, regardless of whether or not
they are actually formulated by these beings. One difficulty for this view is that
second-personally incompetent beings lack the very capacity to make demands.
Perhaps one could argue that the moral community has established the practice of
attributing, not only demands, but also the capacity to address demands to these
beings. But another objection to this proposal might be that, although it might
explain why we fail by a standard that we set when we mistreat second-personally
incompetent beings, it does not explain why we thereby disrespect them.25 Yet, I
think that this proposal is worth further exploration.
5 Conclusion
In this essay, I argued that a contractualist account of respect can reconcile the
Kind-Desire Theory with the intuition that violating a right disrespects the right-
holder. The main argument consisted of three steps. The first step was to contend
that respecting a person is not conceptually tied to correctly responding to her (non-
relational) valuable features. Instead, respect requires taking into account a person’s
reasons for legitimate complaint. The second step was to show that a person’s
reasons for legitimate complaint flow from a public set of shared reasons that need
not coincide with the reasons for complaint that she has qua the particular individual
she is. Third, I argued that this public set of reasons might contain kind-based
desires flowing from role-norms. In light of this argument, I suggested (pace Cruft)
that rights attributed on the basis of role-norms can be viewed as individualistically
justified since they allow their holders to stand in relations of equality with others.
Furthermore, I tried to show that the view presented in this essay can be defended
against a series of potential objections. I conclude that the contractualist account of
respect and the Kind-Desire Theory of rights form a fruitful synthesis.
25 For structurally similar objections to other non-consequentialist approaches to animal ethics, see Sachs
(2015: 643, 646–647).
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